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Abstract
The cost of communication is a substantial factor affecting the scalability of many distributed applications. Every
message sent can incur a cost in storage, computation, energy and bandwidth. Consequently, reducing the communi-
cation costs of distributed applications is highly desirable. The best way to reduce message costs is by communicating
without sending any messages whatsoever. This paper initiates a rigorous investigation into the use of silence in
synchronous settings, in which processes can fail. We formalize sufficient conditions for information transfer using
silence, as well as necessary conditions for particular cases of interest. This allows us to identify message patterns that
enable communication through silence. In particular, a pattern called a silent choir is identified, and shown to be central
to information transfer via silence in failure-prone systems. The power of the new framework is demonstrated on the
atomic commitment problem (AC). A complete characterization of the tradeoff between message complexity and round
complexity in the synchronous model with crash failures is provided, in terms of lower bounds and matching protocols.
In particular, a new message-optimal AC protocol is designed using silence, in which processes decide in 3 rounds
in the common case. This significantly improves on the best previously known message-optimal AC protocol, in which
decisions were performed in Θ(n) rounds.
And in the naked light I saw
Ten thousand people, maybe more
People talking without speaking
· · ·
And no one dared
Disturb the sound of silence
Paul Simon, 1964
Keywords: Silent information exchange, null messages, silent choir, atomic commitment, consensus, optimality, fault-
tolerance, knowledge.
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1 Introduction
The cost of communication is a substantial factor limiting the scalability of many distributed applications (see, e.g.
[27, 18, 25, 19, 23]). Indeed, sending a message imposes costs in storage, computation, energy and bandwidth. Conse-
quently, reducing the communication costs of distributed applications is highly desirable. The best way to reduce these
costs is by communicating without sending any messages whatsoever. In reliable synchronous systems processes can
exchange information in silence, effectively “sending a message by not sending a message,” to use a term from [21]. In
fault-prone systems, however, using silence in this way is considerably more subtle. Roughly speaking, in a reliable system
in which messages from j to i are guaranteed to be delivered within ∆ time units, if j sends no message to i at time t,
then i is able to detect this fact at time t+ ∆. This, in turn, can be used to pass information from j to i. In a setting in
which j may fail, however, it is possible for i not to receive j’s message because j failed in some way.
Given the value of reducing communication costs and the power of silence to do so, efficient protocols for a variety
of tasks of interest make effective, albeit implicit, use of silence (see, e.g., [2, 1, 16, 13, 24, 8, 4]). There is no clear theory
underlying this use of silence, however. This paper initiates a rigorous investigation into the use of silence in synchronous
settings in which processes can fail. We formalize sufficient conditions for information transfer using silence, as well as
necessary conditions for particular cases of interest. This allows us to identify message patterns that enable communication
through silence.
Using the proposed framework, we consider the atomic commitment problem (AC) in synchronous systems with crash
failures [5, 11] as a case study. A silence-based analysis provides new lower bounds on the efficiency of AC protocols
that are optimal in the common case. The conditions identified for using silence are then used to provide protocols that
match the lower bounds. In some cases, the new protocols significantly improve the state-of-the-art.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• Simple rules for silent information transfer in the presence of failures are provided and formalized.
• The Silent Choir Theorem, which precisely captures the communication patterns required for silence to convey
information about the initial values, is proven. In failure-prone systems, a silent choir plays the role that null
messages play in reliable systems, facilitating communication via silence.
• Using a silence-based analysis, lower bounds are established on the number of messages needed for AC protocols
to decide inD rounds in the common case, for any givenD ≥ 1.
• Silent information transfer rules are used to design protocols that prove these bounds to be tight, thereby completely
characterizing the tradeoff between the message complexity and round complexity of AC. For the most interesting
case of message-optimal AC, we present the STEALTH protocol, which reduces the decision times from Θ(n) to
Θ(1) rounds (in fact, from n+ 2f to 3).
This paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces our model of computation, and formal definitions of
indistinguishability, knowledge and AC. Section 3 formalizes how silence can be used to convey information in fault-prone
synchronous message-passing systems. In Section 4 lower bounds and upper bounds for optimal AC in the common case
are established. Finally, concluding remarks are discussed in Section 5.
2 Definitions and Preliminary Results
2.1 Atomic Commitment
In the atomic commitment problem [5, 11, 13, 14], each process j starts out with a binary initial value vj ∈ {0,1}.
Processes need to decide among two actions, commit or abort. All runs of an AC protocol are required to satisfy the
following conditions:
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ATOMIC COMMITMENT:
Decision: Every correct process must eventually decide either commit or abort,
Agreement: All processes that decide make the same decision,
Commit Validity: A process can decide commit only if all initial values are 1, and
Abort Validity: A process can decide abort only if some initial value is 0, or if some process failed.
The AC problem is motivated by distributed databases, in which the processes are involved in performing a joint transaction.
An initial value of 0 can correspond to a vote to abort the transaction, while 1 is a vote to commit the transaction. Typically,
processes enter the AC protocol with a vote to commit, and failures in runs of AC are rare. We call a run in which all
initial values are 1 and no failures occur, a nice run. As first advocated by [11], it is sensible to seek AC protocols that
are optimized for the common case, i.e., for nice runs. Natural parameters to optimize are the number of messages sent
in nice runs, and the number of rounds required for decision, and for halting. We call an AC protocol that sends the fewest
possible messages in nice runs message optimal, and one that decides the soonest round optimal. In a recent paper [13],
Guerraoui and Wang present a message-optimal AC protocol. It uses n+ f − 1 messages in nice runs (for a system
with n processes and up to f crash failures). But this message efficiency seems to come at a cost in terms of decision time:
processes decide in nice runs only at the end of n+ 2f rounds. This raises an interesting open problem of identifying
the tradeoff between message complexity and decision time, for AC protocols in the common case.
2.2 Model of Computation
We consider the standard synchronous message-passing model with benign crash failures. We assume a set P =
{0,1, . . . , n− 1} of n > 2 processes. Each pair of processes is connected by a two-way communication link, and for each
message the receiver knows the identity of the sender. All processes share a discrete global clock that starts at time 0 and
advances by increments of one. Communication in the system proceeds in a sequence of rounds, with roundm+ 1 taking
place between time m and time m+ 1, for m ≥ 0. A message sent at time m (i.e., in round m+ 1) from a process i
to j will reach j by timem+ 1, i.e., the end of roundm+ 1. In every round, each process performs local computations,
sends a set of messages to other processes, and finally receives messages sent to it by other processes during the same
round. A faulty process in a given execution fails by crashing in some roundm ≥ 1. In this case, the process behaves
correctly in the firstm− 1 rounds and it performs no actions and sends no messages from roundm+ 1 on. During its
crashing roundm, the process sends messages to an arbitrary subset among the processes to whom the protocol prescribes
that it send messages in roundm. It does not take any decisions at the end of its crashing round (i.e., at timem). As is
customary in agreement problems such as Consensus, we shall assume that each process i starts at time 0 in some initial
state, which can be assumed for simplicity in this paper to consist of its initial value vi ∈ {0,1}.
At any given timem ≥ 0, a process is in a well-defined local state. For simplicity, we assume that the local state of a
process i consists of its initial value vi, the current timem, and the sequence of the actions that i has performed (including
the messages it has sent and received) up to that time. In particular, its local state at time 0 has the form (vi,0,{}). We
will also assume that once a process has crashed, its local state becomes⊥. A protocol describes what messages a process
sends and what decisions it takes, as a deterministic function of its local state.
We will consider the design of protocols that are required to withstand up to f crashes. Thus, given 1 ≤ f < n, we
denote by γf the model described above in which it is guaranteed that no more than f processes fail in any given run.
We assume that a protocol P has access to the values of n and f , typically passed to P as parameters.
A run is a description of a (possibly infinite) execution of the system. We call a set of runsR a system. We will be
interested in systems of the formRP = R(P, γf) consisting of all runs of a given protocol P in which no more than f
processes fail. Observe that a protocol P solves AC in the model γf if and only if every run ofRP satisfies the Decision,
Agreement and two Validity conditions described above. Given a run r and a timem, we denote the local state of process i
at timem in run r by ri(m). Notice that a process i can be in the same local state in different runs of the same protocol.
Since the current timem is represented in the local state ri(m), however, r(m) = r′(m′) can hold only ifm = m′.
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2.3 Indistinguishability and Knowledge
We shall say that two runs r and r′ are indistinguishable to process i at time m if ri(m) = r′i(m). We denote this by
r ≈mi r′. Notice that since we assume that processes follow deterministic protocols, if r ≈mi r′ then process i is guaranteed
to perform the same actions at timem in both r and r′. Problem specifications typically impose restrictions on actions,
based on properties of the run. Moreover, since the actions that a process performs are a function of its local state, the
restrictions can depend on properties of other runs as well.
For example, the Agreement condition in AC implies that a process i cannot decide to commit at timem in a run r if
there is an indistinguishable run r′ ≈mi r in which some process decides abort. Similarly, by Commit Validity a process i
can not commit if there is a run r′ that is indistinguishable from r (to i at timem) in which one of the initial values is 0.
Similarly, by Abort Validity i can not abort at timem if there exists a nice run r′ ≈mi r (i.e., all initial values are 1 and
no failure occurs in r′). These examples illustrate how indistinguishability can inhibit actions — performing an action
can be prohibited because of what may be true at indistinguishable runs.
Rather than considering when actions are prohibited, we can choose to consider what is required in order for an action
to be allowed by the specification. To this end, we can view Commit Validity as implying that process i is allowed to
perform commit at time m in r only if all initial values are 1 in every run r′ ≈mi r. This is much stronger than stating
that all values are 1 only in the run r itself, of course. Roughly speaking, the stronger statement is true because at timem
process i cannot tell whether it is in r or in any of the runs r′ ≈mi r. When this condition holds, we say that i knows
that all values are 1. More generally, it will be convenient to define the dual of indistinguishability, i.e., what is true at
all indistinguishable runs, as what the process knows. More formally, following in the spirit of [17, 12], we proceed to
define knowledge in our distributed systems as follows.1
We shall focus on knowledge of facts that correspond to properties of runs. We call these facts about the run, and
denote them by ϕ, ψ, etc. In particular, facts such as “vj = 1” (j’s initial value is 1), “j is faulty” (in the current run),
and “j decides commit” (in the current run), are all examples of facts about the run.
Definition 1 (Knowledge). Fix a systemR, a run r ∈ R, a process i and a fact ϕ. We say thatKiϕ (which we read as
“process i knows ϕ”) holds at timem in r iff ϕ is true of all runs r′ ∈ R such that r′ ≈mi r.
Notice that knowledge is defined with respect to a given system R. Often, the system is clear from context and is
not stated explicitly. Definition 1 immediately implies the so-called Knowledge property: IfKiϕ holds at (any) timem
in r, then r satisfies ϕ.
We use Boolean operators such as ¬ (Not), ∧ (And), and ∨ (Or) freely in the sequel. While the basic facts ϕ, ψ, etc.
of interest are properties of the run, knowledge can change over time. Thus, for example, Ki(vj = 0) may be false at
timem in a run r and true at timem+ 1, based perhaps on messages that i does or does not receive in roundm+ 1.
A recent paper [26] provides an essential connection between knowledge and action in distributed protocols called the
knowledge of preconditions principle (KoP). It states that whatever must be true when a particular action is performed by
a process imust be known by i when the action is performed. This is one way of capturing the role of indistinguishability
discussed above. More formally, we say that a fact ϕ is a necessary condition for an action α in a systemR if for all runs
r ∈ R and timesm, if α is performed at timem in r then ϕmust be true at timem in r. For deterministic protocols in
synchronous models such as γf , the KoP can be stated as follows:
Theorem 1 (KoP, [26]). Fix a protocol P for γf , let i ∈ P and let α be an action of i inRP . If ϕ is a necessary condition
for α inRP thenKiϕ is a necessary condition for α inRP .
We denote the fact that all initial values are 1 by all[1]. Since all[1] is a necessary condition for performing commit
in AC, Theorem 1 immediately implies the following, which will be useful in our analysis of AC in Section 4:
Corollary 1 (Hadzilacos [14]). When a process i commits in a run of an AC protocol, it must know all[1] (in particular,
Ki(vj = 1) must hold for every process j).
Hadzilacos [14] is a very elegant paper that was the first to apply knowledge theory to the study of commitment problems.
1We introduce just enough of the theory of knowledge to support the analysis performed in this paper. For more details, see [12].
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3 Silence in the Presence of Crashes
In a reliable setting, we can intuitively describe information transfer via silence as follows (we formalize the rules S1—S3
in Section 3.1):
S1. Silent inference from a reliable source: Suppose that a process j is guaranteed to send i a message at time t in
case some condition ϕ of interest is false. If, by time t+ ∆, process i has not received a message that j sent to i at time t,
then i can infer that ϕ holds.
In fact, extensive use of silence can achieve an even greater effect. Suppose that the proper operation of a synchronous
system depends on the truth of local conditions ϕj, for different processes j. In this case, all nodes of the system can be
informed that all conditions hold simply if no process reports a violation of its local condition. Effectively, this achieves
a (silent) broadcast from each process to all processes, at no cost.
Notice that silence can be informative only in case there are alternative circumstances (e.g., when ϕ does not hold)
under which a message would be received by i. Thus, in a precise sense, the use of silence can serve to shift the
communication costs among scenarios. This can be especially useful for optimizing the behavior of protocols in cases
of interest. Most popular is optimization for the common case (often referred to as fast path/slow path protocols) in which
a protocol is designed to be very efficient in the common case, at the expense of being less efficient in uncommon cases.
In S1, the ability to convey information by silence depends on a reliability assumption, since if j may fail by crashing,
for example, then it would be possible for i not to hear from j even if ϕ is untrue. The information conveyed by a null
message in this case can be described by:
S2. Silent inference from an unreliable source: Suppose that a process j is guaranteed to send i a message at time t in
case some condition ϕ of interest does not hold and it is not faulty. If, by time t+ ∆, process i has not received a message
that j sent to i at time t, then i can infer that at least one of the following is true: (i) ϕ holds, or (ii) a failure has occurred.
In particular, if j sends messages to i over a reliable communication link, then (ii) reduces to process j being faulty. Despite
the fact that imay fall short of inferring that ϕ holds when it does not hear from j, the information that it does obtain may
still be very useful. In many problems having to do with fault-tolerance, the specification depends on whether failures occur.
Thus, for example, in the original atomic commit problem [11, 13], deciding to abort is allowed if one of the initial values
is 0, or if a failure occurs. In Byzantine agreement [28] and weak agreement [20], deciding on a default value is allowed
in case of a failure. But this is not true in general. In the popular consensus problem, for example, the Validity condition
is independent of whether failures occur [7], thus rendering conditional knowledge as provided by S2 insufficient. As we
will see, there are circumstances under which silence can provide unconditional information even in the face of failures.
For ease of exposition, our investigation will focus on synchronous message-passing systems, in which processes
communicate in rounds, and a message sent in a particular round is received by the end of the round. Moreover, we will
consider settings in which only processes may fail, and there is an a priori bound of f on the number of processes that
can fail. One way to infer unconditional information in such settings is captured by:
S3. Silent inference with bounded failures: Assume that at most f processes can fail, and let S be a set of at least f+1
processes. Moreover, suppose that every process j ∈ S is guaranteed to send i a message no later than roundm in case ϕ
does not hold and j is not faulty. If i hears from no process in S by timem, then i can infer that ϕ holds.
S3 is used, for example, by Amdur et al. [1], who consider message-efficient solutions to Byzantine agreement. In order
to prove to all processes that the original sender completed the first round, their protocol has the sender send messages
to a set B of f processes in the second round. In the third round, a member of B sends no messages if it received the
sender’s second round message (implying that the sender did not fail in the first round), and sends messages to everyone
otherwise. The set S = {sender} ∪B satisfies the above rule, and allows all processes to infer the fact ϕ = “the sender
completed the first round successfully” based on silence in the third round.
The rules S1-S3 provide sufficient conditions for silent information transfer. As we will show, both S2 and S3 can
be used to facilitate the design and analysis of efficient fault-tolerant protocols. Moreover, S3 is in a precise sense also
a necessary condition for inferring particular facts of interest from silence. This, in turn, will allow us to obtain simple
and intuitive proofs of lower bounds and matching optimal protocols.
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3.1 Silent Broadcast
There are several ways to formally state the rules S1—S3; we will state them in a form that will be most convenient to use
in the sequel. It is natural to capture the fact that process i infers that ϕ holds using the knowledge terminology. Moreover,
in a synchronous setting, not sending a message at a given point is a choice just like performing an action. In S1, process j
is assumed not to send a message in case ϕ holds. Thus, by the knowledge of preconditions principle (Theorem 1), j must
know ϕ to make this choice. We say that a protocol guarantees a property if this property is true in all runs of the protocol.
We can thus formalize S1 as follows:
Lemma 1. LetR be a synchronous system with reliable communication in which process j reliably follows a protocol P.
Let ϕ be a fact about runs inR and assume that P guarantees that if ¬Kjϕ at timem− 1 then j sends a message to i
in roundm. If i does not receive a message from j in roundm of a run r ∈ R thenKiϕ holds at timem in r.
Proof. Fix r ∈ R and assume that i does not receive a message from j in roundm of r. Moreover, choose an arbitrary
run r′ ∈ R such that r′ ≈mi r. By Definition 1 it suffices to show that r′ satisfies ϕ. By assumption, i has the same
local state at timem in both runs, and so it does not receive a message from j in roundm of r′. SinceR is synchronous
and communication is assumed to be reliable, it follows that j did not send a message to i in roundm of r′. Process j is
assumed to reliably follow the protocol P. Hence, by assumption,Kjϕmust be true at timem− 1 in r′, or else it would
have sent a message to i. By the knowledge property it follows that ϕ holds at time m− 1 in r′. Moreover, since ϕ is
a fact about runs, r′ satisfies ϕ, and we are done.
S2 considers information gained by silence in systems in which processes can fail, such as the context γf . In this case,
imight not receive a message from j due to a failure, rather than because of information that j has at the beginning of the
round. We thus obtain a weaker variant of Lemma 1, formalizing S2:
Lemma 2. Let ϕ be a fact about runs in the system RP = R(P, γf), and fix i, j ∈ P and a timem > 0. Moreover,
assume that P guarantees that if ¬Kjϕ at timem− 1 then j sends a message to i in roundm. If i does not receive a
roundm message from j in a run r ∈ RP thenKi(ϕ∨ j is faulty) holds at timem in r.
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Lemma 1. Fix r ∈ R and assume that i does not receive a message from j
in roundm of r. Moreover, choose an arbitrary run r′ ∈ R such that r′ ≈mi r. By Definition 1 we need to show that r′
satisfies (ϕ∨ j is faulty). By assumption, i has the same local state at timem in both runs, and so it does not receive a
message from j in roundm of r′. However, since inRP the protocol P is applied in the unreliable context γf , there are
two possible reasons for this. One is that j fails in r′ before it has a chance to send i a message in round m, in which
case j is faulty in r′. The other one is that j reliably follows P at timem− 1, in which case by assumption,Kjϕmust be
true at timem− 1 in r′ (implying ϕ is true in r′), or else it would have sent a message to i. It follows that (ϕ∨ j is faulty)
must be true in r′, and we are done.
Clearly, the knowledge that is obtained by silence in γf, as captured by Lemma 2, is contingent, and hence quite a
bit weaker than what can be guaranteed in the more reliable setting of Lemma 1. As mentioned in the Introduction, there
are problems in which such weaker knowledge may be sufficient. A closer inspection shows, however, that it is possible
to obtain unqualified knowledge even in fault-tolerant settings such as the context γf. The key to this is the fact that even
when any single process may be faulty, a process is often guaranteed that a set of processes must contain a nonfaulty
process. In this case, we can use Lemma 2 to obtain the following formalization of S3:
Corollary 2. LetRP = R(P, γf), let ϕ be a fact about runs inRP , fix a process i ∈ P and a set |S| > f of processes.
Moreover, assume that for all j ∈ S the protocol P guarantees that if ¬Kjϕ at timem− 1 ≥ 0 then j sends a message
to i in roundm. If, in some run r ∈ RP , process i does not receive a roundm message from any process in S, thenKiϕ
holds at timem in r.
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Proof. Under the assumptions of the claim, choose a run r′ ≈mi r in RP . It suffices to show that ϕ is true in r′. Since
|S| > f there must be a process h ∈ S that is correct in r′. Lemma 2 implies that (ϕ ∨ h is faulty) is true in r′. But
since h is not faulty in r′ we obtain that ϕ holds in r′, as required.
Corollary 2 shows how a set |S| > f of processes can inform a specific process i of a fact ϕ by not sending messages
to i. In fact, with no extra cost the set S can be silent to all processes in a roundm of interest, thereby informing everyone
that ϕ holds. We call this a silent broadcast.
3.2 The Silent Choir Theorem
The rule S3 and its formalization in Corollary 2 show that a protocol can orchestrate information transfer through silence by
first informing (perhaps directly) a large enough set of processes about the fact of interest. We now show that, in a precise
sense, this is indeed necessary. Intuitively, transferring information through silence requires enough processes to be mum
to ensure that at least one of them is correct. We will call this the Silent Choir Theorem. The direct information transfer
in the reliable case (S1) is a particular instance of this, because a choir of one suffices when there are no failures. While
the sufficient conditions of Section 3.1 apply rather broadly to general facts ϕ about runs, to prove necessary conditions
we need to restrict attention to certain primitive facts. This is because knowledge of a composite fact such as conjunction
ϕ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2, for example, can be obtained by separately learning about each of its components. Intuitively, a primitive
fact is a fact that is local to a process j and whose truth is not determined by the local states of the other processes. For
ease of exposition, our analysis will exclusively consider a single primitive fact, the fact vj = 1 stating that j’s local value
is 1. Knowledge about initial values plays an important role in many problems, including consensus [7, 10] and AC.
Our treatment will make use of message chains. Given processes i, i′ ∈ P and times m,m′ ≥ 0, we say that there
is a message chain from (i,m) to (i′,m′) in a run r, and write (i,m) r (i′,m′), if either (a) i = i′ and m ≤ m′, or
if (b) there exist processes i = j0, j1, . . . , j` = i′ and times m ≤ t0 < t1, . . . ,< t` ≤ m′ such that for all 0 ≤ k < `,
a message from jk to jk+1 is sent in r at time tk. Such a message chain is said to have length `. (Notice that m ≤ t0,
so the first message in the chain may be sent after time m.) We say that there is a message chain from i to j in r if
(i,0) r (j,m) for some timem ≥ 0.
Recall that in γf process j’s initial value is not known to processes i 6= j at the start. Clearly, one way in which
process i can come to know that vj = 1 is by direct communication, i.e., via a message chain from j to i. Alternatively,
i can learn this fact using silence. The ways by which a process i can come to know that vj = 1 in γf are characterized
by the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Silent Choir). Let r be a run of a protocol P in γf. Denote by Fr the set of faulty processes in r, and define
Srj (t) , {h ∈ P : (j,0) r (h, t)}. IfKi(vj = 1) holds at timem in r and r does not contain a message chain from j
to i, thenm > 0 and |Fr ∪ Srj (m− 1)| > f .
Proof. Let i, j, r and m satisfy the assumptions. If there is a message chain from j to i in r, then we are done. So
assume that no such message chain exists. Let r′ be a run in which vi is the same as in r and vj = 0. Clearly, r ≈0i r′
and so ¬Ki(vj = 1) at time 0 in r. It follows that m > 0. Roughly speaking, Srj (t) is the set of processes that could
have learned vj by time t, via a message chain from j. We will establish that |Fr ∪ Srj (m− 1)| > f by proving the
contraposition; i.e., that if |Fr ∪ Srj (m− 1)| ≤ f then i does not know that vj = 1 at timem. Intuitively, the claim will
follow because if |Fr ∪ Srj (m− 1)| ≤ f then iwould consider it possible at timem that vj = 0 and j crashed initially,
and that everyone who may have noticed its value crashed without informing anyone.
More formally, for every h ∈ Srj (m−1), define kh to be the round in r in which h first receives a message completing a
message chain from j. Consider a run r′ ofP in which vj = 0 and all other initial values are the same as in r. Every process
h ∈ Srj (m− 1) crashes in round kh + 1 of r′ without sending any messages. (In particular, j crashes initially.) The faulty
processes in r′ are those in Fr ∪Srj (m− 1). By assumption, their number does not exceed f , and so r′ is a run ofP in γf .
We now prove by induction on ` in the range 0 ≤ ` ≤m− 1 that for all z ∈ P, if z /∈ Srj (m− 1) or z ∈ Srj (m− 1)
but ` < kz, then rz(`) = r′z(`), and z sends the same messages and performs the same actions in round `+ 1 of both
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runs. Recall that j ∈ Srj (m− 1) and kj = 0. For ` = 0 we have that rz(0) = r′z(0) for all z 6= j since by choice of r′
all initial values other than vj are the same in both runs. Since P is deterministic, all processes other than j send the
same messages and perform the same actions in round 1. Let 0 < ` ≤m− 1, and assume that the inductive claim holds
for `− 1. Suppose that either z /∈ Srj (m− 1) or both z ∈ Srj (m− 1) and ` < kz. Then by definition of Srj (m− 1)
and kz it follows that in round ` of r process z receives no messages from a process y ∈ Srj (m− 1) for which ky < `− 1.
Consequently, z receives the same set of messages in round ` of both runs. Since rz(`− 1) = r′z(`− 1) by the inductive
hypothesis, it follows that rz(`) = r′z(`). Again, since P is deterministic, z will send the same messages and perform
the same actions in round `+ 1 of both runs. This completes the inductive argument.
The inductive claim implies, in particular, that all z /∈ Srj (m− 1) send the same messages in roundm of both runs r
and r′. Notice that i /∈ Srj (m− 1) by assumption, and i receives no messages from processes in Srj (m− 1) in roundm of
the original run r. It follows that i receives the same set of messages in roundm of both runs. Since i /∈ Srj (m−1) we also
have that ri(m−1) = r′i(m−1), and so we obtain that ri(m) = r′i(m). In other words, the two runs are indistinguishable
to i at timem. By construction, vj 6= 1 in r′, and soKi(vj = 1) does not hold at timem in r. The claim follows.
By Theorem 2, any run in which a process learns about initial values without an explicit message chain must contain
a silent choir. Indeed, it is possible to identify a silent choir in the message-optimal AC protocol of [13], as well as in
message-optimal protocols for Byzantine agreementf [1, 16] and for failure discovery [15].
4 Efficient Protocols for Atomic Commitment
Guerraoui and Wang [13] present state-of-the-art protocols for AC optimized for nice runs in a variety of models and point
out that there is a tradeoff between time and messages in their protocols. Thus, for example, for γf they present three
different protocols. In nice runs of their most message-efficient protocol, n+ f − 1 messages are sent, and processes
decide after n+ 2f rounds. In nice runs of their fastest protocol, decisions are obtained within two rounds, and 2n2 − 2n
messages are sent.
4.1 Lower Bounds on AC in the Common Case
We are now ready to apply the formalism of Section 3 to the analysis of AC protocols that are efficient in the common
case. Our first goal is to show that silence must be used in message-optimal AC protocols. To do so, we start by proving
a useful combinatorial property relating message chains and message complexity:
Lemma 3. Let k > 0, and assume that the run r contains, for every process j ∈ P, message chains to at least k other
processes. Then at least n+ k− 1 messages are sent in r.
Proof. First notice that every process i ∈ P must send at least one message in r, since it has message chains to other
processes. Define the rank of a process i ∈ P to be the length of the longest message chain from (i,0) in the run r. If
there is a process with rank ≥ n+ k − 1 we are done. Otherwise let h be a process with minimal rank, and let M be
the set of messages on chains that start at h. Clearly |M | ≥ k, because r contains message chains from h to at least k
other processes. Moreover, every j 6= hmust send at least one message that is not inM , since otherwise j’s rank would
be strictly smaller than that of h. Thus, at least n− 1 + |M | ≥ n+ k− 1 messages must be sent in r, as claimed.
The message-optimal AC protocol for γf presented in [13], which we shall refer to as the GW protocol, sends n+f−1
messages in nice runs. This can be used to prove
Corollary 3. Message-optimal AC protocols in γf must make use of silence when f < n− 1.
Proof. Every process i commits in a nice run r, and by Corollary 1 imust know that vj = 1, for all j, when it commits.
Theorem 2 implies that if silence is not used in r, then there must be a message chain from j to i. The conditions of Lemma 3
thus hold in r for k = n−1, implying that a nice run must send at least 2n−2 > n+f−1 messages. The claim follows.
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Recall that the common case in this setting consists of nice runs, i.e., runs where all initial values are 1, and no failures oc-
cur. Corollary 1 captures a basic property of AC protocols: A committing process must know that all initial values are 1. The
Silent Choir Theorem and the KoP can be used to show the following property, which will be key to our lower bound proofs:
Lemma 4. When a process i commits in a run of an AC protocol, it must know, for every j ∈ P, that there is a message
chain from j to some correct process in the current run.
Proof. Assume that i commits in the run r of P. By Theorem 1, it suffices to show that if i commits in r then r contains a
message chain from j to some correct process, for every j ∈ P. Fix j ∈ P. Since f < n, there must be at least one correct
process in r; denote it by h. Given that i commits in r, we have by Agreement that h commits in r. Let us denote bym the
decision time of h. By Corollary 1 we have thatKh(vj = 1) holds when h commits. If there is a message chain from j
to h in r we are done, since h is the desired correct process. Otherwise, Theorem 2 states that |Fr ∪ Srj (m− 1)| > f .
Thus, Srj (m− 1) contains a correct process and there is a message chain from j to a correct process in r.
We are now in a position to state and prove a set of lower bounds on the tradeoff between the decision time and
number of messages sent in nice runs of AC protocols.
Theorem 3. Let P be an AC protocol for γf , letD be the number of rounds at the end of which decision is reached in
its nice runs, and letM be the number of messages sent in nice rounds. ThenD andM satisfy the following constraints:
(a) M ≥ n+ f − 1; 2
(b) if f > 1 thenD > 1;
(c) IfD = 2 thenM ≥ fn; and
(d) IfM = n+ f − 1 and f > 1 thenD ≥ 3.
Proof. Throughout the proof, r will denote a nice run of an AC protocol P. To prove part (a), it suffices, by Lemma 3,
to prove that the run r must contain, for every process j ∈ P, message chains from j to at least f other processes. Fix a
process j. If r contains message chains from j to all other processes then we are done, since f ≤ n−1. Otherwise, let i be
a process to whom there is no message chain from j in r. Since r is nice, all processes commit in r. Denote bym the time
at which i commits. Given that there is no message chain from j to i in r, Theorem 2 implies that |Fr ∪ Srj (m− 1)| > f ,
where Srj (m− 1) is the set of processes to whom a message chain from j is completed by timem− 1 in r. Since r is
nice we have that Fr = ∅, and so |Srj (m− 1)| > f . Finally, as j ∈ |Srj (m− 1)|, there must be message chains from j
to at least f other processes in r. For part (b), suppose that f > 1 and that i ∈ P commits at time 1 in r, and choose a
process j 6= i. Consider the run r′ of P in which everyone starts with 1, and only i and j fail. Moreover, j fails in the
first round without sending messages to any process other than i, while i crashes after deciding to commit, and sends no
messages after the first round. The run r′ is a run of P in γf , since f > 1. The run r′ contains no message chain from j
to a correct process. Recall that i commits at time 1 in r. By construction, r′ ≈1i r, and hence, when i commits in the
nice run r, it does not know that the run contains a message chain from j to a correct process, contradicting Lemma 4. For
part (c) it suffices to show that ifD = 2 then every process must send at least f messages in r. Let P be an AC protocol
withD = 2, let i ∈ P, and denote by T the set of processes to which i sends messages in the nice run r. Assume, by way
of contradiction, that |T | < f . Consider a run r′ of P in which i crashes after deciding, without sending any messages
after the second round. Moreover, every process h ∈ T fails in the second round without sending messages to any process
except possibly to i (to whom h sends iff it does in r). The run r′ is a run of P in γf because it contains |T |+ 1 ≤ f
failures. The run r′ contains no message chain from i itself to a correct process. Moreover, r′ ≈2i r by construction,
and therefore when it commits in r, process i does not know that the run contains a message chain from j to a correct
process. As in part (b), this contradicts Lemma 4. Finally, part (d) follows directly from part (c), since fnmessages must
be delivered when deciding inD = 2 rounds, and the assumption that f > 1 implies that fn ≥ 2n > n+ f − 1.
Next we turn to prove that the bounds of Theorem 3 are tight by providing matching upper bounds.
2We state and prove part (a) for completeness. It was proved for f = n− 1 by Dwork and Skeen [11], and appears for general f in Guerraoui
and Wang [13], with some details of the proof omitted.
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4.2 Upper Bounds on AC in the Common Case
Recall that we consider the set of processes to be P = {0,1, . . . , n− 1}. Roughly speaking, the message-optimal GW
protocol spends n + f − 1 rounds creating a long chain of n + f − 1 messages sent in cyclic order from process 1
through n− 1 and then continuing to 0, . . . , f . It then runs a consensus protocol for another f rounds starting at time
n+ f to decide among the actions commit and abort. In our terminology, the first process to know that vj = 1 for all j
is process 0. The processes 0,1, . . . , f form the silent choir: They must inform the processes in case the chain is broken.
At time n+ f , if a process is not informed of a problem, it knows that all initial values are 1.
Using the terminology of Theorem 3, the GW protocol decides inD = n+ 2f rounds. Dwork and Skeen’s message-
optimal protocol for the case f = n− 1 decides in D = 2n+ 1 rounds [11]. There is a very large gap between these
decision times and the lower bound of D ≥ 3 established in Theorem 3(d). We now present the STEALTH protocol, a
message-optimal AC protocol that decides inD = 3 rounds. We will then proceed to present two additional protocols
that are round optimal, deciding inD = 2 rounds for the case of f > 1 and inD = 1 round when f = 1, respectively.
Together, these three protocols prove that the bounds in Theorem 3 are all tight, and completely characterize the tradeoff
between time and message complexities in the common case for AC protocols.3 Full descriptions of all protocols in this
section, and their proofs of correctness, appear in Appendices A – C.
STEALTH: an AC protocol withD = 3 andM = n+ f − 1.
Fast Path: In the first round, all processes that have value 1 send a message to process 0. If process 0 hears from all
processes, it sends messages to processes 1,2, . . . , f in the second round. In case all these messages are indeed sent, no
messages are sent in the third round. A process that receives no message in the third round performs commit at time 3.
Finally, if such a process receives no messages in the fourth round, it halts at time 4.
Slow Path: The slow path in STEALTH operates as follows. Any member of the choir that did not receive its second round
message (or n− 1 first-round messages in the case of process 0) broadcasts (i.e., sends all processes) an “error” message
in the third round. Any process that receives error messages in the third round broadcasts a clarification request message
“huh?” in the fourth round. Finally, if any “huh?” message is sent in the fourth round, then the processes run an f−1 crash-
tolerant consensus for f rounds starting in the fifth round. The variant of consensus used by STEALTH has the property that
if a correct process starts with value 1 then the final decision is 1. For details, see Appendix A. A process votes 1 (in favor
of committing) in the consensus protocol if it received no message in the third round, or if it is in the choir and received
its second round message. It votes 0 (in favor of aborting) otherwise. Processes that participate in the consensus protocol
halt when their role in the consensus protocol ends. In the worst case, the last process halts in STEALTH at time f + 5.♣
In nice runs, the STEALTH protocol constructs a silent choir for the fact that all values are 1 in round 2, and uses
round 3 to allow the choir to perform a silent broadcast of this fact to all processes. Interestingly, it uses silence in an
additional manner: Round 4 performs a silent broadcast from all processes to all processes. This does not require a silent
choir because it makes use of the rule S2: a null message from j informs i that j is either active and has committed, or
has crashed without deciding. The next protocol also uses two rounds of silence in a similar manner.
D2: an AC protocol withD = 2 andM = fn.
Fast Path: In the first round, every process j with vj = 1 sends messages to the f processes j + 1, j + 2, . . . , j + f
(wrapping around mod n). A process that sent messages and received all f possible messages in the first round remains
silent in the second round. A process that receives no messages in the second round performs commit at time 2. Finally,
if such a process receives no messages in the third round, it halts at time 3.
Slow Path: The slow path is similar in spirit to that of STEALTH, starting one round earlier. A process j such that vj = 0,
or that does not receive first-round messages from all of its f predecessors j − 1, j − 2, . . . , j − f (mod n) broadcasts
an “error” message in the second round. In the third round, a process that (sent or) received an “error” message in the
3Guerraoui and Wang present a protocol called 1NBAC in [13] in which processes decide in the second round in nice runs, but do so after the
sending phase of the second round, and before receiving second-round messages. 1NBAC requires 2n2 − 2n messages in nice runs. In Appendix D
we prove a lower bound of n2 + fn− n messages for their model, and present a matching protocol that proves that the bound is tight.
9
second round broadcasts a message listing all processes whose values it knows to be 1. All processes that do not halt at
time 3 participate in a consensus protocol as in STEALTH, that starts in the fourth round. In this case, a process enters
the consensus protocol with value 1 iff it knows that all initial values were 1. ♣
Our third protocol treats the boundary case of f = 1. Rather than two silent rounds, only the latter one, corresponding
to S2, is needed in nice runs:
D1f1: an AC protocol withD = 1 andM = n2 − n for f = 1.
Fast Path: In the first round, every process j with vj = 1 sends messages to all other processes. A process with value 1
that receives messages from all processes in the first round performs commit at time 1. Finally, if such a process receives
no messages in the second round, it halts at time 2.
Slow Path: For the slow path, a process j with vj = 1 that does not receive messages from everyone in the first round
broadcasts a “huh?” message in the second round. A committed process that receives such a message in the second round,
responds in the third round with an “all[1]” message to the requesting process j. Finally, a process that did not commit
at time 1 will perform commit at time 3 if it received an “all[1]” message in the second round, and will perform abort
otherwise. All processes halt at time 3 (possibly after deciding at time 3) and send no messages in the fourth round. ♣
5 Discussion
In the well-known story Silver Blaze, Sherlock Holmes is able to conclude that a victim’s dog was familiar with the
murderer, based on the fact that the dog was silent when the criminal entered [9]. In that example, Conan Doyle crisply
illustrates how crucial knowledge can be gained by observing silence. The focus of our investigation has been on the use
of silence in distributed protocols. A variety of protocols in the literature make implicit use of silence (e.g., [6, 8, 22]).
In network protocols, periodically sending Keep-alive messages is commonly used to inform a peer that a node is active.
The absence of such messages allows the peer to discover that a failure has occurred [29].
As has been elucidated by [21], synchronous channels allow processes to send null messages by not sending a message.
In a precise sense, our analysis considers what information can be passed using null messages. This becomes especially
interesting in systems with failures, since the absence of a message in such settings can be caused by a failure, rather than
by deliberate silence. In the presence of a bounded number of crash failures, we identified the notion of a silent choir as an
essential component of information transfer by silence. We showed that the only way that a process j can inform another
process i of j’s initial value without an explicit message chain between them is by constructing a silent choir (Theorem 2).
Indeed, in a variety of message-optimal protocols it is possible to identify silent choirs. These include [13] for Atomic
Commitment, [1, 16] for Byzantine Agreement, and [15] for the failure discovery problem.
The silent choir is a valuable tool for a protocol designer. By directly constructing silent choirs, we were able to reduce
the number of rounds for message-optimal AC protocols from n+ 2f to 3 in the STEALTH protocol, and to design a
protocol (D2) that is message optimal among round-optimal AC protocols in Section 4.2. Since silent choirs are necessary
in some cases, they can also serve in theoretical analyses. In Theorem 3, we used the necessity of silent choirs to obtain
a complete characterization of the tradeoff between decision times and communication costs for AC protocols.
A notion of potential causality for reliable synchronous systems based on allowing null messages in message chains
was defined in [3]. Defining a similar notion for fault-prone systems by using silent choirs rather than null messages is
an interesting topic for further investigation.
While our investigation focused on the synchronous round-based model γf in which processes fail by crashing and
the network is fully connected, it applies to more general synchronous systems. In particular, the rules S2 and S3 and
their formalizations, as well as the Silent Choir Theorem, hold with minor modifications even in the presence of Byzantine
failures. The use of silence, and more generally the topic of how information can be gleaned from actions that are not
performed by processes in a system, is an exciting topic that deserves further investigation in the future.
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A The STEALTH Protocol
Recall that the goal is optimizing AC for the common-case, i.e., for nice runs. Therefore, in order to capture the essence
of silence and simplify the protocols, improvements regarding other cases (the uncommon cases) are left out. In some
not “nice” runs the STEALTH and D2 protocols make use of a consensus variant we denote as B.1.Consensus (standing
for BIASED-TO-1-UNIFORM-CONSENSUS). The properties that a B.1.Consensus protocol satisfies are:
Definition 2. Protocol P is a BIASED-TO-1-UNIFORM-CONSENSUS (which we denote by B.1.Consensus), iff every
run r of P satisfies the following conditions:
Validity: A process decides on a value vˆ only if some process proposes vˆ.
Agreement: No two process decide differently.
Decision: Every correct process eventually decides, and
Biased-to-1: If some correct process starts with 1, processes may only decide 1.
The STEALTH protocol, sketched in Section 4.2, is presented in Figure 1. It reaches the lower bound of Theorem 3(d). That
is, for f > 1, STEALTH is round-optimal among message-optimal AC protocols withM = n+f−1 andD = 3. The pro-
tocol is also optimal in bits as well as in messages. Each message sent in STEALTH consists of a single bit. Both all[1], ‘err’
and ‘huh?’ can be represented by ‘1’ as they are the only messages that might appear in rounds 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
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round 1
∀i ∈ P:
if vi = 1 then send ‘1’ to process 0
round 2
Process 0:
if received ‘1’ from all then send all[1] to processes {0,1,2, ..., f}
round 3
Processes {0,1,2, ..., f}:
if received no message from process 0 in round 2 then send ‘err’ to all
round 4
∀i ∈ P:
if did not receive any ‘err’ then commit
else send ‘huh?’ to all
round 5
∀i ∈ P:
if no ‘huh?’ message received then halt
else
vˆi ←
{
1 if received all[1] or performed commit
0 otherwise
}
;
dec← B.1.Consensus(f − 1, vˆi);
if haven’t performed commit then
commit if dec = 1,
abort if dec = 0
Figure 1: STEALTH: protocol by rounds. All processes participate in rounds 1,4 and 5, only process 0 in round 2, and
only processes {0,1,2, ..., f} in round 3. In nice runs everyone decides in round 4 and halts in round 5.
Two possible runs of STEALTH are illustrated in Figure 2. A nice run goes as in Figure 2a: round 1 all processes send 1
to process 0; round 2 process 0 sends all[1] to processes 1,2, .., f ; round 3 all processes are quiet; round 4 all processes
decide 1; and finally in round 5 all processes halt. Figure 2b depicts an example of a complicated run that is not nice. It goes
as follows: in round 1 all processes send 1 to process 0; in round 2 process 0 tries to send all[1] to processes 1,2, .., f
(a) STEALTH: A nice run (all vote 1 and no failures
occur).
(b) STEALTH: Example of a run with failures.
Figure 2: Example for two possible runs of STEALTH
13
but crashes. some receive it and some not; in round 3 processes from {1,2, .., f} that didn’t receive all[1], send err to
all, the rest are quiet; in round 4 all processes that received err send ‘huh?’ to all (asking for help); in round 5 the living
processes start B.1.Consensus, a process that knows all[1] starts with 1 (green smiley), the rest start with 0 (red smiley).
A.1 Correctness of STEALTH
Recall that the specification of the AC problem is given in Section 2.1. The detailed description of STEALTH appears in
Figure 1 below. We now consider the protocol’s correctness. Throughout the Appendix, the protocols are assumed to
execute in the context γf .
Claim 1. If r is a nice run of STEALTH, then exactly n+ f − 1 messages are sent over the network, and all processes
perform commit at time 3 in r.
Proof. Let r be a nice run of STEALTH. Since r is nice, it holds that vi = 1 for all i ∈ P and no failures occur, therefore, r
goes as follows: In the first round n− 1 messages of ‘1’ are sent to process 0. In round 2, process 0 sends all[1] to
S = {0,1,2, ..., f}, adding f to the total number of sent messages (it does not actually sends a message to itself). In
round 3 all is quiet (no message is sent), then, at time 3, all processes perform commit. This results in a total of n+ f − 1
sent messages. The communication pattern is illustrated in Figure 2a.
Lemma 5. All runs of STEALTH satisfy commit validity.
Proof. Let r be a run of STEALTH in which some process, say i, starts with 0, we show that no decision in r is commit.
By construction of STEALTH, since i starts with 0 in r, it does not send ‘1’ to process 0 in round 1. Thus, in round 2
of r, process 0 does not receive ‘1’ from all and will not send all[1] to anyone. In round 3 of r, none of processes
in S = {0,1,2, ..., f} receive all[1] from process 0, so they send err to all (if not crashed). Since |S| = f + 1, it is
guaranteed that at least one of them is correct in r, so in round 3 all have heard err (at least from the correct process).
Thus, in round 4 of r, no one commits and each process send ‘huh?’ to all. In round 5 B.1.Consensus is initialized and
starts. Since no process ever received all[1] from process 0 in the 2nd round of r, all processes in B.1.Consensus are
initialized with 0. From B.1.Consensus validity guarantee, it only returns 0 in r, hence, the only decisions possible in r
is abort and no process performs commit in r.
Lemma 6. All runs of STEALTH satisfy abort validity.
Proof. Let r be a run of STEALTH in which no process starts with 0 (they all start with 1) and no failures occur, then r
is a nice run by definition. By Claim 1 no process performs abort in r (they all perform commit).
Lemma 7. All runs of STEALTH satisfy decision.
Proof. Let r be a run of STEALTH and let i ∈ P be a correct process in r. If i does not decide in round 4 of r, then it
starts B.1.Consensus. By the decision guarantee of B.1.Consensus, i decides in a finite number of rounds in r.
Lemma 8. All runs of STEALTH satisfy agreement.
Proof. Let r be a run of STEALTH. We prove by dividing into the two possible cases for r: case (1) All decisions in r are
done after round 4. By construction of STEALTH this implies that all decisions in r are made according to a consensus proto-
col, therefore, in this case r satisfies agreement based on the agreement property pf consensus. case (2) Some process, say i,
decides by round 4 in r. By construction of STEALTH every process that decides by round 4, including i, decides commit in
round 4. For process i to commit in round 4 of r, all process in S = {0,1,2, ..., f}must be quiet in round 3. |S| = f + 1,
therefore, at least one of the process inS is correct in r and is quiet because it knows all[1] (process 0 or someone that heard
all[1] from process 0). Let’s name this process pgood. By construction of STEALTH, processes that decide after round 4
in r send ‘huh?’ to all in round 4. After which all processes that have not crashed by round 5 in r start B.1.Consensus. pgood
is correct in r and therefore if a process decides round 4 in r it participates in B.1.Consensus, and since pgood knows all[1],
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it initializes its consensus’ initial-value to 1. B.1.Consensus is a uniform-consensus-biased-to-1. Thus, because of pgood
is correct and starts with 1, the biased to-1 condition of ensures that all decisions of B.1.Consensus in r will be 1, which
leads to commit. Consequently, every process in r that decides after round 4 decides commit (like all decisions by round 4
in r), and r satisfies agreement in this case as well. We got that in both possible cases r satisfies agreement.
Claim 2. STEALTH is an AC protocol in γf .
Proof. Lemmas 5, 6, 7, and 8 prove that every run of the STEALTH protocol in the context γf satisfies the required
conditions for AC, thus, establishing that STEALTH is an AC protocol in the context of γf .
B The D2 Protocol
The protocol in Figure 3 commits at time 2 in nice runs and uses only nf messages to do so.
∀i ∈ P:
round 1
if vi = 1 then send ‘1’ to {i, i+ 1, ..., i+ f} mod n;
round 2
if received fewer than f + 1 messages of ‘1’ then send ‘err’ to all;
round 3
if did not receive ‘err’ in previous round then commit;
else send everyone the id’s of processes from whom 1 was received in round 1;
round 4
if did not receive any messages in round 3 then halt;
else
vˆi ←
{
1 if received all id’s {0,1, ..., n− 1} or performed commit
0 otherwise
}
;
dec← B.1.Consensus(f − 1, vˆi);
if haven’t performed commit then
commit if dec = 1,
abort if dec = 0
Figure 3: D2 - Protocol: Total cost of a nice run = nf .
We next prove the correctness of D2.
B.1 Correctness of D2
Claim 3. If r is a nice run of PD2 in context γf , then exactly fn messages are sent over the network and all processes
perform commit at time 2 in r.
Proof. Let r ∈ R(PD2, γf) be a run in which all processes start with 1 and no failure occurs (a nice run). Then r goes as
follows: In round 1 of r every i ∈ P sends 1 to {i, i+1, ..., i+f} (a total ofn·f messages), and they all receive the message.
Thus, in round 2 all processes received the expected messages so they all remain quiet. Since every process i did not
receive err by time 2, it commits at time 2. Hence, exactly fnmessages are sent and all processes commit at time 2 in r.
Lemma 9. All runs of PD2 in context γf satisfy commit validity.
Proof. Let r be a run ofPD2 in γf , in which some process i ∈ P starts with vi = 0. We show that no process commits in r.
In round 1 i does not send 1 to {i, i+1, ..., i+f}, thus, in round 2 all correct processes in {i, i+1, ..., i+f} send err
to all. Since |{i, i+ 1, ..., i+ f}| > f , at least one of these process is correct in r and therefore its err messages reaches
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all processes by time 2. Because every process received an err message in round 2, in round 3 none of them decides.
(Instead, they all send the id’s of processes from whom they received 1.) As no process received 1 from i in round 1, no
one sends the id of i in round 3, Hence, no process receives all id’s by time 4 in r. Therefore, in round 4 every j ∈ P
starts consensus with vˆj = 0. By consensus validity no process decides 1 (and consequently commits) in r.
Lemma 10. All runs of PD2 in context γf satisfy abort validity.
Proof. Let r be a run of PD2 in γf , in which all processes start with 1 and no failure occur (a nice run). We show that
all processes commit at time 2 in r.
In round 1 of r every i sends 1 to {i, i+ 1, ..., i+ f}, and they all receive the message. Thus, in round 2 all processes
received the expected messages so they all remain quiet. Since every process i did not receive errby time 2, it commits
(in the beginning of round 3). Hence, all processes commit in r.
Lemma 11. All runs of PD2 in context γf satisfy agreement.
Proof. Let r be a run ofPD2 in γf . If all decisions in r are done before round 4, it is only committing, and thus, r satisfies
agreement. If no decision in r is done before round 4, then all decisions are according to a uniform consensus protocol and
thus, r satisfies agreement. Hence, the only case left to check is when some, but not all, processes decide before round 4,
specifically this happens at time 2.
Let i be a process that decides at time 2 in r, we will prove that all other processes that decide in r, decide the same
as i. By construction of PD2, every decision before round 4 is commit, thus, i and whomever decides before round 4
are committing. We are left to show that every decision after time 4 is to commit as well. Since i did not receive any err
messages in round 2 and no more then f failures are possible in r, then, for every j ∈ P there is at least one correct process
in {j, j + 1, ..., j + f} which received 1 from j in round 1. This process succeeds in sending j’s id to all in round 3 of r.
In round 4, for every j ∈ P its id was received by all processes. Therefore, all processes start the consensus protocol with
initial value of 1, and by validity of consensus all decisions must be 1 ( and consequently to commit). Thus, they all agree
with i, proving the claim that r satisfies agreement.
Lemma 12. All runs of the PD2 in context γf satisfy decision.
Proof. Let r be a run of PD2 in γf . By construction of PD2, correct processes who don’t decide at time 2 or r will do
so using the consensus protocol that starts in round 4. As the consensus protocol satisfies decision, all correct processes
eventually decide in r.
Claim 4. Protocol PD2 (Figure 3) is an AC protocol in γf
Proof. Lemmas 9, 10, 11, and 12 prove that all runs of PD2 in the context γf satisfy the required conditions for AC, thus,
making protocol D2 an AC protocol in the context of γf .
C The D1f1 Protocol
In the special case of a single possible failure protocol D1f1 is presented in Figure 4.
C.1 Correctness of D1f1
Claim 5. If r is a nice run of PD1f1 in γ1, then exactly n2 − n messages are sent over the network and all processes
perform commit at time 1 in r.
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∀i ∈ P:
round 1
if vi = 1 then send ‘1’ to all;
round 2
if vi = 1 and received ‘1’ from all in previous round then commit;
else send ‘huh?’ to all;
round 3
if performed commit and did not receive any ‘huh?’ in previous round then halt;
else if performed commit and received ‘huh?’ from j in previous round then send all[1] to j;
round 4
if received all[1] in previous round then commit; halt;
else abort; halt;
Figure 4: D1f1 - Protocol: A special protocol for f = 1 that decides at time 1 (For f > 1 we proved D ≥ 2). Total
cost of a nice run is n2 − nmessages.
Proof. Let r ∈ R(PD1f1, γ1) be a run in which all processes start with 1 and no failure occur (a nice run). Then r goes
as follows: In round 1 of r every process sends 1 to all, and they all receive the message. Thereafter, since every process
had received 1 from all, it performs commit at time 1 of r. As all perform commit in round 2 no ‘huh?’ message is sent
in r. Finally, all processes halt at time 2. Hence, every process sends n− 1 messages (a total of n2 − n over the network)
and commits at time 1 in r.
Corollary 4. All runs of PD1f1 in γ1 satisfy abort validity.
Proof. Let r be a run of PD1f1 in γ1, in which all processes start with 1 and no failures occur (a nice run). Then
by Claim 5 no process aborts in r (they all commit).
Lemma 13. All runs of PD1f1 in γ1 satisfy commit validity.
Proof. Let r ∈ R(PD1f1, γ1) be a run in which some process j ∈ P starts with vj = 0. We show that no process commits
in r. In round 1 of r, j does not send 1 to anyone, thus, in round 2 all processes did not receive 1 from all and therefore
all processes send ‘huh?’ to all. Since no process performed commit in round 2, no all[1] messages are sent in round 3
of r. Finally, a process that reaches round 4 has received no message of all[1] previously, therefore, it decides abort at
time 4 of r. Hence, no process commits in r (they either abort or crash).
Lemma 14. All runs of PD1f1 in γ1 satisfy agreement.
Proof. Let r be a run of PD1f1 in γ1. If no decision (to commit) is done at time 1 in r, then there is no process to
send all[1], therefore, decisions are made only to abort at time 3 of r, and thus, r satisfies agreement. On the second case, if
a process, say i, decides commit at time 1 in r, then if i does not crash until round 4 in r it would send all[1] to all undecided
processes in round 3, thus, enforcing them to perform commit at time 3 of r. If, however, i is faulty in r then no other process
fails in r (no more than a single failure is possible in γ1). Hence, since i decided in round 2, ∀j ∈ P : vj = 1 and no one
crashes in round 1. Thus, all decide to commit at time 1 in r. We get that on the second case, some process decides commit
at time 1, then all decisions are commit and r satisfies agreement. Thus, for all cases r satisfies agreement.
Lemma 15. All runs of PD1f1 in γ1 satisfy decision.
Proof. Let r be a run of PD1f1 in γ1. By construction of PD1f1, correct processes who don’t decide at time 1 in r,
decide at time 3 in r. Therefore, all correct processes eventually decide in r (at time 3 latest).
Claim 6. Protocol PD1f1 (Figure 4) is an AC protocol in γ1.
Proof. Lemmas 4, 13, 14, and 15 prove that all runs of protocol PD1f1 in the context γ1 satisfy the required conditions
for AC, thus, making protocol PD1f1 an AC protocol in the context of γ1.
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D Committing in Mid-Round
As proved in Theorem 3(b), if f > 1 then no AC protocol commits in time 1 of a nice run in γf. Guerroui and Wang
however, present in [13] a protocol that solves AC and commits at time 1 of a nice run! How is this magic performed?
The answer lays in the model. In [13] the commonly used synchronous context of γf is replaced with a different
one (which we denote as context γ˜f ). The difference is that in γ˜f if process i performed a message sending action in
its crashing round, it is guarantied that the message would be sent correctly, whereas in γf , the sending of i’s messages in
its crashing round is not guarantied. Since, γ˜f is a particular case of γf our protocols are also correct in γ˜f . The opposite
is however not true. For completeness we also analyze the decision before time 2 in γ˜f here.
The following lemma forms the basis of the analysis,
Lemma 16. Assume that f > 1, let r be a nice run of an AC protocol in γ˜f , and let i ∈ P be a process that decides
before time 2 in r. Then (a) i receives a first-round message from every process in r, and (b) i sends at least f round-two
messages before it commits.
Proof. Let r and i satisfy the assumptions in the claims statement. In particular, i commits in r at time 1, perhaps after
sending some messages in round two. By Corollary 1, process i needs to know that all initial values were 1 when it
commits. If i does not receive a round one message from some process j 6= i, then there is a run r′ in which vj = 0,
everyone else starts with 1, and j crashes before sending any messages. Clearly r′ is a legal run, ri(1) = r′i(1), and so i
does not know that vj = 1 at time 1 in r. This establishes (a).
To prove (b), fix, in addition, a process j. Since f > 1 and i has no information about failures at time 1 in r, i
considers it possible that j crashed without sending round one messages to anyone other than i and that, in addition, i
itself will crash immediately after committing.
Recall from Lemma 4 that when i commits, it must know that there is a message chain in the run from j to at least
one correct process, with respect to every j ∈ P. If i is the only process who has heard from j in round one and it crashes
immediately after committing, then the only way that there will be a message chain from j to a correct process is if i sends
round-two messages to at least f − 1 processes other than j before it commits. Since f > 1 by assumption, imust send
at least one message in round two before committing. Let j′ be a process to whom i sends a round-two message before
committing in r. The same argument as we have made w.r.t. j (ensuring a message chain from j′ to a correct process),
yields that i must send round-two messages to at least f − 1 processes other than j′. Since i also sends a round-two
message to j′, it follows that imust send at least f round two messages before committing, establishing claim (b).
Lemma 16 states that every process that commits before time 2 in a nice run must receive at least n− 1 messages
in the first round and send at least f messages in the second. Thus, we get:
Corollary 5. For f > 1, no AC protocol in context γ˜f can commit in a nice run without sending round-two messages.
Moreover, using Lemma 16 and the fact that every round-one message is received by a unique process, and every
round-two message is sent by a unique process, we obtain:
Corollary 6. Let P be an AC protocol in γ˜f , in which all processes commit before time 2 in every nice run. Then at least
n2 + fn− n messages are sent in every nice run of P.
This lower bound is below the upper bound of 2n(n− 1) presented in [13], thereby leaving a gap of n2 − (f + 1)n.
We therefore close this gap with the protocol in Figure 5.
Deciding before being able to receive second-round messages makes it impossible to use silence in the second round.
Therefore round one must achieve an all to all message pattern in order forKiall[1] to hold for every i ∈ P. By sending
messages to f other process informing them all[1] in the second round, i knows that a correct process will know all[1]
and thereby, i can commit.
As in STEALTH, all messages of the protocol consist of a single bit. The only non-trivial one is ‘huh?’, implemented
in 1-bit by: quiet to {i+ 1, ..., i+ f}%n; 1 to the rest;
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∀i ∈ P:
round 1
if vi = 1 then send ‘1’ to all;
round 2
if received ‘1’ from all in previous round
then send all[1] to {i+ 1, ..., i+ f} mod n; commit;
else send ‘huh?’ to all;
round 3
if did not receive any ‘huh?’ in previous round then halt;
else
vˆi ←
{
1 if received all[1] or performed commit
0 otherwise
}
;
dec← B.1.Consensus(f − 1, vˆi);
if haven’t performed commit then
commit if dec = 1,
abort if dec = 0
Figure 5: 1.5D-algorithm: Total cost of a nice run is n2 − n+ nf .
D.1 Correctness of 1.5D Protocol
Claim 7. If r is a nice run of P1.5D in γ˜f , then exactly n2 +nf −nmessages are sent over the network and all processes
perform commit at time 1 in r.
Proof. Let r be a run of P1.5D in γ˜f , in which all processes start with 1 and no failure occur (a nice run). Then r goes
as follows: In round 1 of r every process sends 1 to all, and they all receive the message (n− 1 messages per process).
In round 2 of r every process had received 1 from all, therefore it sends its f round 2 messages successfully, and then
perform commit at time 1. Hence, every process sends n+ f − 1 messages (a total of n2 + nf − n over the network)
and commits at time 1 in r.
Corollary 7. All runs of P1.5D in context γ˜f satisfy abort validity.
Proof. Let r be a run of P1.5D in γ˜f , in which all processes start with 1 and no failures occur (a nice run). Then by Claim 7
no process aborts in r (they all commit).
Lemma 17. All runs of P1.5D in context γ˜f satisfy commit validity.
Proof. Let r be a run of P1.5D in γ˜f , in which some process j ∈ P starts with vj = 0. We show that no process commits
in r. In round 1 of r, j does not send 1 to anyone, thus, in round 2 all processes did not receive 1 from all and therefore all
processes send ‘huh?’ to all. Since no all[1] messages were received in round 2 of r, in round 3 processes begin the consen-
sus protocol with vˆ = 0, therefore by validity of consensus no process decides 1 and therefore no process commits in r.
Lemma 18. All runs of P1.5D in context γ˜f satisfy agreement.
Proof. Let r be a run of P1.5D in γ˜f . If all decisions are done before round 3 of r, it is only committing, and thus,
r satisfies agreement. If no decision is done in r before round 3, then all decisions are according to a uniform consensus
protocol and thus, r satisfies agreement. Hence, the only case left to check is when some, but not all, processes decide
before round 3 (in round 2).
Let i be a process that decides before round 3 in r, we will prove that all other processes that decide in r, decide the
same as i. By construction of P1.5D every decision before round 3 is commit, thus, i and whomever decides before round 3
commit in r. We are left to show that every decision after time 3 in r is commit as well. Since i committed in round 2 of r,
Kiall[1] holds in r, moreover, i informed f+1 processes (including itself) that all[1] holds in r, we denote this group of
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processes by Si. The bound of f possible failures insures us that at least one process in Si is correct and knows all[1] in r.
This correct process will start the consensus protocol with vˆ = 1 and by the 1-tending property of the consensus used, all
decisions would be 1 which leads to commit. Thus, they all agree with i, proving the claim that r satisfies agreement.
Lemma 19. All runs of P1.5D in context γ˜f satisfy decision.
Proof. Let r be a run of P1.5D in γ˜f . By construction of P1.5D, correct processes who don’t decide in round 2 of r,
decide using the consensus protocol that starts in round 3. As the consensus protocol satisfies decision in γ˜f , all correct
processes eventually decide in r.
Claim 8. Protocol P1.5D (Figure 5) is an AC protocol in γ˜f .
Proof. Lemmas 7, 17, 18, and 19 prove that all runs of protocol P1.5D in the context γ˜f satisfy the required conditions
for AC, thus, making protocol P1.5D an AC protocol in the context of γ˜f .
20
